Ransomware Incident Response Plan Template

Standard Operating Procedure: Ransomware Incident Response Plan (IRP)

1. Document Control Block

• Document ID: SOP-SEC-042
• Effective Date: October 24, 2023
• Version: 3.1.0
• Review Cadence: Semi-Annual (or immediately following any Sev-1 security incident)
• Classification: RESTRICTED - INTERNAL USE ONLY

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2. Executive Summary & Purpose

This Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) defines the institutional response lifecycle for containing, eradicating, recovering from, and investigating ransomware and extortion events within Template Registry infrastructure. The objective is to minimize business interruption, preserve digital forensics evidence, prevent lateral movement, and ensure rapid, deterministic recovery from immutable backups.

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3. Scope & Prerequisites

• Scope: All physical servers, virtualized instances, cloud infrastructure (AWS/GCP/Azure), containerized workloads, CI/CD pipelines, and corporate endpoints managed by Template Registry.
• Required Tools & Access:
  • Out-of-band management interfaces (IPMI/iDRAC/AWS Console).
  • Isolated jump hosts with pre-staged incident tooling (EDR console, Volatility, Wireshark, Autopsy).
  • Cryptographic verification utilities (sha256sum, GnuPG).
  • Immutable backup read-only access credentials.
  • Secure, out-of-band communication channels (Signal/ Wickr Enterprise / PagerDuty).
• Personal Protective Equipment (PPE): Not applicable (Digital Operations).

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4. Roles & Responsibilities (RACI Matrix)

Legend: R = Responsible, A = Accountable, C = Consulted, I = Informed.

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5. Step-by-Step Procedure

Phase 1: Detection, Triage, and Scoping (T+0 to T+30m)

• Receive automated alert from EDR/SIEM or human notification of abnormal file modifications or ransom notes.
• Convene the Emergency Incident Response Bridge (PagerDuty automated trigger).
• Designate the Incident Commander (IC) and establish an isolated, out-of-band communication channel.
• Verify the scope of infection by querying the EDR dashboard for active beaconing, mass file-rename operations, or shadow copy deletions.
• Classify the incident severity (Sev-1: Enterprise-wide or core infrastructure impact; Sev-2: Isolated segment or non-production impact).

Phase 2: Containment and Isolation (T+30m to T+2h)

• Network Segmentation: Execute automated network isolation scripts via EDR/SD-N to sever infected hosts from the corporate network while maintaining hypervisor/IPMI reachability for forensics.
• Identity Preservation: Revoke all active session tokens, Kerberos tickets, and OAuth grants for users associated with compromised endpoints.
• Credential Rotation: Force-reset high-privilege service accounts, domain admin credentials, and cloud root access keys.
• Backup Protection: Immediately verify that primary and secondary backup repositories are logically and physically air-gapped to prevent propagation to immutable storage.

Phase 3: Evidence Collection and Eradication (T+2h to T+6h)

• Forensic Snapshot: Capture volatile memory (RAM) and disk images of representative infected endpoints before initiating any remediation.
• Sample Extraction: Isolate and extract samples of the ransomware binary, ransom note, and encrypted file extensions for threat intelligence analysis.
• Root Cause Analysis (RCA): Identify the initial access vector (e.g., compromised VPN credentials, unpatched CVE, phishing vector) and close the vulnerability.
• Complete Eradication: Purge malicious persistence mechanisms (scheduled tasks, registry run keys, web shells, unauthorized user accounts) across all affected environments.

Phase 4: Recovery and Validation (T+6h to T+24h)

• Clean Build Provisioning: Re-image affected hosts from verified clean, gold-standard templates or bare-metal deployments; do not perform in-place restoration from unverified backups.
• Data Restoration: Restore user data and databases from immutable, cryptographically verified backups taken prior to the zero-hour timestamp.
• Integrity Checks: Execute checksum verification and application smoke tests to confirm data integrity and functional readiness.
• Staged Reconnection: Reintroduce sanitized workloads to the production network in a controlled, phased manner under heightened SIEM monitoring.

Phase 5: Post-Incident Review and Closure (T+24h to T+72h)

• De-escalation: Formally declare the incident closed once system metrics and security telemetry stabilize for 24 continuous hours.
• Post-Mortem Documentation: Conduct a blameless post-incident review with all engineering and operational leads.
• Artifact Archival: Securely archive all forensic images, logs, and communication transcripts in compliance with regulatory retention schedules.
• SOP Iteration: Update this SOP and related infrastructure automation scripts based on lessons learned during the incident.

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6. Quality Assurance & Pro-Tips

Best Practices

• Never Power Off Infected Machines: Powering down a machine destroys volatile memory artifacts (RAM) that may contain decryption keys or injection traces. Use network isolation instead.
• Assume Lateral Movement: Treat any single endpoint compromise as a total domain compromise until proven otherwise through exhaustive log auditing.

Common Pitfalls to Avoid

• Paying the Ransom: Template Registry has a strict zero-negotiation and zero-payment policy. Payment does not guarantee data recovery, encourages repeat attacks, and may violate international sanctions.
• Premature Reconnection: Reintroducing an un-patched or partially cleaned host back into the network will trigger a secondary reinfection event.

Metric Thresholds

• Mean Time to Detect (MTTD): < 15 minutes from initial execution.
• Mean Time to Isolate (MTTI): < 30 minutes from detection.
• Recovery Time Objective (RTO): < 12 hours for critical customer-facing control planes.
• Recovery Point Objective (RPO): < 4 hours of potential data loss via immutable snapshots.

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7. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

Q: What should I do if an administrator account is actively locking files during off-hours? A: Immediately disable the compromised user account via the Identity Provider (IdP) console and execute the global network isolation playbooks via the EDR CLI. Do not wait for managerial approval during a Sev-1 security event.

Q: Can we use third-party decryption tools found online? A: Only if the tool is explicitly validated by the SecOps/DFIR Lead and tested in an isolated staging environment. Running unverified decryptors on production data risks permanent corruption.

Q: Who is authorized to communicate with external media or law enforcement? A: Only Executive Leadership and Legal Counsel are authorized to make public statements or interface with external entities (including law enforcement and regulatory bodies). Engineering staff must direct all external inquiries through the designated communications channel.