Cyber Incident Response Plan Template UK

Standard Operating Procedure: Cyber Incident Response Plan (CIRP)

Document ID: SOP-SEC-UK-084
Effective Date: March 30, 2026
Version: 3.1.0
Review Cadence: Semi-Annual
Author: Julian Vance, Chief Architect, Template Registry

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1. Executive Summary & Purpose

This Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) defines the institutional-grade framework for detecting, containing, eradicating, and recovering from cyber security incidents within Template Registry infrastructure. Aligned with the UK Data Protection Act 2018, UK GDPR, and National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) guidelines, this document establishes a mandatory, repeatable protocol to preserve digital forensics integrity, minimize operational downtime, and ensure statutory notification compliance.

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2. Scope & Prerequisites

Scope

This procedure applies to all cloud-native environments, on-premises hardware, endpoints, SaaS integrations, and personnel operating under Template Registry governance within the United Kingdom jurisdiction.

Prerequisites & Required Tooling

• SIEM / Log Aggregation: Datadog / AWS CloudWatch / Splunk Enterprise.
• EDR (Endpoint Detection & Response): CrowdStrike Falcon Sensor.
• Forensics & Capture: Volatility Framework, Wireshark, dd / AWS Snapshot utilities.
• Communication Channels: Out-of-band PagerDuty, encrypted Signal incident bridge.
• Statutory References: ICO (Information Commissioner’s Office) reporting portal access credentials.

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3. Roles & Responsibilities (RACI Matrix)

(Legend: R = Responsible, A = Accountable, C = Consulted, I = Informed)

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4. Step-by-Step Procedure

Phase 1: Preparation & Triage (Detection)

• Monitor automated alerts routed via PagerDuty to the on-call Security Operations Center (SOC).
• Validate the anomaly against baseline system behavior to eliminate false positives.
• Classify the incident severity level (Sev-1: Critical Data Breach / Sev-2: Service Degradation / Sev-3: Isolated Alert).
• Convene the out-of-band incident response bridge if classified as Sev-1 or Sev-2.

Phase 2: Containment (Short-term & Long-term)

• Isolate compromised network segments or host endpoints via EDR network containment protocols.
• Revoke active IAM sessions, OAuth tokens, and rotate service account API keys linked to the breach footprint.
• Preserve volatile memory (RAM) and generate forensic disk snapshots of affected nodes prior to rebooting.
• Implement egress firewall blocklists for identified Command and Control (C2) IP addresses and domains.

Phase 3: Eradication

• Identify root-cause vulnerabilities (e.g., unpatched CVEs, compromised credentials, misconfigured S3 buckets).
• Remove malicious persistence mechanisms, backdoors, web shells, and unauthorized user accounts.
• Patch software vulnerabilities and apply compensating security controls.
• Validate system integrity against known-good cryptographic hashes and golden images.

Phase 4: Recovery

• Restore affected systems from verified, malware-free immutable backups.
• Re-enable network interfaces and user access incrementally under heightened logging conditions.
• Conduct comprehensive post-restoration scanning using vulnerability assessment and EDR tools.
• Declare operational stabilization to Executive Leadership following a mandatory 24-hour observation window.

Phase 5: Post-Incident Review & UK Compliance Reporting

• ICO Notification Check: If personal data freedom or rights are compromised, draft and submit the statutory notification to the UK Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) within the mandatory 72-hour window.
• Notify affected data subjects without undue delay if the breach presents a "high risk" to their rights and freedoms.
• Conduct a blameless post-incident review (PIR) with engineering and compliance stakeholders within 5 business days.
• Update detection rules, system architecture, and this SOP based on lessons learned.

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5. Quality Assurance & Pro-Tips

Best Practices & Pro-Tips

• Preserve Chain of Custody: Always export forensic images using write-blockers or cloud-native immutable snapshot APIs to ensure admissibility in legal proceedings.
• Out-of-Band Communications: Never utilize internal corporate Slack/Teams channels for Sev-1 incident discussions if the tenant compromise scope is unconfirmed; default to encrypted out-of-band tooling.

Common Pitfalls to Avoid

• Premature Remediation: Do not power down compromised hosts immediately; volatile memory artifacts will be lost, hindering root-cause analysis.
• Delayed Notification: Do not wait for a complete forensic breakdown to notify the LCO regarding potential UK GDPR Article 33 triggers.

Metric Thresholds

• Mean Time to Detect (MTTD): $\le 15$ minutes for automated alerts.
• Mean Time to Respond (MTTR): $\le 60$ minutes for Sev-1 containment.
• ICO Reporting Window: $< 72$ hours from confirmation of personal data breach.

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6. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

Q1: At what point must we legally notify the UK ICO regarding a cyber incident?
A: Under UK GDPR Article 33, notification is mandatory if the incident leads to a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons. This must be executed within 72 hours of becoming aware of the breach, even if complete forensic details are still pending.

Q2: Who possesses the unilateral authority to shut down production infrastructure during an active containment phase?
A: The Incident Commander (IC), in direct consultation with the Lead Security Engineer, holds the emergency authorization to sever network connectivity or spin down production instances to mitigate catastrophic data loss.